
Security Management and Poverty: The Niger Delta Experience (1999-2017)

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Abstract

This study sought to determine whether there is relationship between insecurity and poverty using the Niger Delta as focus point. It also aimed to carefully examine the relationship between security management and poverty levels with attention on the Niger Delta. The study intentionally employed the theory of frustration-aggression for its theoretical framework. The main argument of the frustration-aggression theory suggests that the occurrence of insecurity has a link with the existence of poverty. The research design employed are ex post facto and causal design. A 3 stage sampling technique was employed to generate primary data from 405 respondents which include ex-militants, youth, security agencies, community leaders and government officials in 3 states: Rivers, Bayelsa and Delta. Descriptive and inferential statistics were used for the data generated. Percentages, mean, frequencies, tables and charts were used to answer research questions. The Chi-square (X^2) statistical tool was used to test the hypotheses at 0.05 level of significance. The main findings showed that; there is a significant relationship between insecurity and poverty based on the Niger Delta experience, and also, there is a significant relationship between security management and poverty levels in the Niger Delta. The study concludes that in fact poverty caused the Niger Delta's insecurity. The study recommended that to manage the Niger Delta's security challenges, the issues of poverty should be effectively and proactively addressed by the political leadership, ungoverned places like the creeks should be transformed into productive use. Likewise, environmental issues should be given priority. There should be constructive engagement between the government and the people.

Keywords: Ex-militants, Insecurity, Niger Delta, Poverty, and security.

1.0 Introduction

1.1 Background of the Study

Since the return of current democratic dispensation in 1999, Nigeria has been faced with series of challenges bordering on security. The Southern parts of the country grapple with militancy cum kidnapping. Those in the Northern part, especially the North-East geopolitical zone, live in complete fear not knowing where and when the next set of bombs may explode. There are clashes between farmers and herdsmen in different parts of the country. Many Nigerians as well as foreign nationals living in the country have suffered either loss of lives or damage to property due to security challenges the country is facing (see Abubakar, 2005 cited by Adesina, 2013:153; Taft & Haken, 2015 in Darma, Sani, & Kankara, 2016:120; Omale, 2016; Ayelowo, 2016:1; CEDAW Coalition on Women, Peace and Security, 2017:2-3).

Presidential Amnesty Programme appeared to have temporarily resolved the issue of militancy in the Niger Delta (Egbeme, 2015:3; Ayelowo, 2016:4) given that hostility was halted as the

militant groups embraced the peace deal by the Federal Government (see Paki & Ebienfa, 2011:143). Unfortunately, the success of the amnesty was seriously threatened recently with the resurgence of militancy in the Niger Delta (Ayelowo, 2016:1; CEDAW Coalition on Women, Peace and Security, 2017:2-3).

Given that the Niger Delta is not only faced with serious security challenges, the area is also facing the daunting possibilities for surmounting the challenge of infrastructural development. The likely implication of this situation if not addressed, could degenerate into a condition where gangs and armed warlords operating in the region will undermine the region and plunge it into a dangerous zone which could pose serious threat to the economy, peace and stability of the Niger Delta in particular and Nigeria in general.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

There seems to be a contention among scholars on the pattern which the relationship between insecurity and poverty takes, and this has naturally developed into insecurity-poverty relationship debates. One school of thought argues that insecurity is caused by the level of poverty in a given place, while the other school of thought submits that the existence of poverty is as a result of insecurity in the given area (see Versteegen, 2001 cited in Ajodo-Adebanjoko & Walter, 2014:367; Ikejiaku, 2012:128).

Another ground of debate in the insecurity-poverty relationship is the link between security management and poverty levels. In this regard, Hameso (2007) as cited in Ikejiaku (2012:134) explains that both political and economic factors have a way they interact despite their distinct explanatory factors. This view suggests a likely relationship between security management and poverty levels. An objective assessment of the claims of the contending schools of thought appears compelling to determine the relationship between insecurity and poverty cum the relationship between security management and poverty levels in the Niger Delta. The hypotheses therefore are:

H₀₁: There is no significant relationship between insecurity and poverty in the Niger Delta.

H₀₂: There is no significant relationship between security management and poverty levels in the Niger Delta.

2.0 Literature Review

2.1 Theoretical Framework

Among the different theoretical options that can be used to analyse this study, the frustration-aggression theory is preferred. The frustration-aggression theory is traceable to the research work at Yale University Institute of Human Relation which was led by John Dollard, Leonard Doob, Neal Miller, O.H. Mower, and Robert Sear in 1939, with the aim to study human aggression. Their efforts have since been popularised and made relevant in the study of security challenges (Olusola, 2013:150; Berkowitz, 1989 in Ibaba, 2013:203).

Alluding to the frustration-aggression theory, Van de Goor & others (1996) seen in Ikejiaku (2012:131) submit that the theory simply shows that individuals turn aggressive when there are hindrances against the satisfaction of their basic material necessities. Supporting this view, Nicky (1998:50-53) quoted by Abegunde (2013:8) states that frustration sets in when one's desired goal cannot be met because of obstacle. And that the aggression is intended to inflict injury on the perceived source of frustration. The bright side of the frustration-aggression theory to this study is that it offers a logical and empirical bases for the work.

2.2 The Concept of Security

Paradoxically, Thamos (2008) in Robert-Okah (2014:4) likens security to an insurance cover held by the political leaderships such that wars may be minimised, while normal conditions among and within the states may be maximised. This view tends to picture the role of political leaders in the management of national security. Differently, Nwagboso (2012:244) states that the idea of security could properly be understood when situated within the context of a reference object and that without a critical discourse of something important to secure, the idea of security is senseless. The reference object cum important thing to secure in this view point simply refers to the citizens.

In this regard, Osawe (2013) in Osawe (2015:124) defines security as the protection of the citizenry from hunger, disease, poverty, unemployment, and natural disasters. This simply suggests that the citizenry should be protected from situations that can make life very difficult for them. Broadening the view of security, Akinola (2016:3) likened it to a standard that can be used to measure the viability of a given state. He went further to state that the satisfaction of basic needs, protection of basic needs, and protection of cultural and religious identity of the people among others are parts of security. In the context of this study, security refers to all the actions taken to ensure the protection of the people while also keeping the state sovereignty.

2.3 The Concept of Insecurity

Breland (2005) in Robert-Okah (2014:4) defines insecurity as a condition of fear or anxiety that stems from a real or an assumed lack of protection, especially in an environment where the people do not have freedom from danger. This view simply defines insecurity in terms of lack of protection from real or assumed danger. For Julius (2014:89) however, insecurity may come as a deliberate act targeted at certain result. This view makes one to wonder whether insecurity is a sort of business to some people or not. Besides, the view can detract one from genuine reasons that can potentially trigger insecurity.

Akinola (2016:3) considers insecurity as both a red alert and a risk at the same time. He likens insecurity to a situation where the concerned society is on red alert, indicating also that a risk factor has been identified which must be contained. This view reveals that insecurity can be defined as an impression that things are not alright, in terms of safety, and that something is needed to be done to make it right. In the context of this study, insecurity specifically relates to militancy cum related activities which suggest that something is not right and that the people are not protected.

2.4 The Concept of the Poor

In his study of London in the 1880s, Charles Booth as cited by Ebegbulem, Ekpe, & Adejumo (2013:283), describes the poor as, "Those living under a struggle to obtain the necessities of life and make both ends meet." This view reveals that the poor are people who live through struggling condition in order to obtain basic needs of life, such as food, clothing and shelter. Also shedding light on the concept of the poor, Shultz (1993) as cited in Igwe (2015:41) explains that the poor utilise virtually more than the half of their actual earnings on food only, while their life expectancy at birth is within the average of 35 years. He further explains that the poor have low level of skills and knowledge given that their access to education is limited (Igwe, 2015:41-42). This view suggests that the poor may have difficulty in saving their incomes as it is virtually spent on their feeding. It further shows that the poor have limited access to education with low life expectancy.

Consequently, Nnamani (2003) as cited in Oyebamiji & Mba (2014:31) noted that the poor lack the capacity to escape from their status by themselves and therefore suggests that they need help from the government. This view acknowledges the fact that the poor do not have what it takes to go away from the condition they found themselves and thereby offers a way out in the form of government intervention. In the context of this study, the poor generally refers to those who are unable to satisfy their basic needs of life and are in need of government help.

2.5 The Concept of Poverty

Valentine (1968) quoted in Oyebamiji & Mba (2014:30) simply views that the basic meaning of poverty centres around and is all about “relative deprivation”. This suggests that the existence of poverty simply implies that one is deprived of certain necessities of life. Alluding to this view, Friedman (1999) as cited in Ajodo-Adebanjoko & Walter (2014:366) rightly views poverty as a form of disempowerment in terms of socio-economic, political and psychological perspective. While Valentine sees poverty in terms of relative deprivation, Friedman sees it in the form of political, socio-economic, and psychological disempowerment.

Along this line, Olufemi, Balami, & Ochogwu (2016:50) define poverty as a dynamic process of socio economic, political or any related deprivation which affect the individual households or communities and usually results in lack of access to basic necessities of life. The authors add that poverty affects many aspect of the human condition, including physical, moral and psychological being. In the context of this study, poverty refers to a condition of multiple disadvantages consequent of inadequate means to access basic needs.

2.6 Insecurity and Poverty

Harrington (2012) in Punch Editorial (February 19, 2012) cited by Ogbonnaya & Ehigiamusoe (2013:5) is of the view that handlers of political offices can exploit widespread poverty to their advantage. Alluding to this, Emuedo (2013:4) comments that political leader can draw from pool of the poor to form political thugs for the purpose of elections and that the political thugs can later turnout to become a prepared ground for insecurity.

To Goodhand (2001) cited from Ikejiaku (2012:130), poverty ordinarily may not trigger insecurity. What this suggests is that poverty may not directly lead to insecurity without the presence of other factors. Sharing the same position, Aftab (2008) in Ibaba (2013:195) also supports that insecurity cannot be triggered by poverty in and of itself. Aftab comes to this conclusion having undertaken an empirical study on the causes of insecurity in Pakistan. What the finding simply reveals is that though poverty may fuel insecurity, it cannot stand alone to cause insecurity.

Ikejiaku (2012:128-129) postulates that the research on insecurity-poverty relationship has proven inconclusive. He further notes that consensus has not been established on whether poverty is the factor behind security challenges (Ikejiaku, 2012:130). Ikejiaku was of the opinion that the relationship between poverty and insecurity is more or less an indirect one. Given these opinions, an objective assessment of the respective claims appears to be necessary.

2.7 Managing Security

Yusuph Olaniyonu in This Day (November 5, 2009) seen in Basse (2012:89) observed that managing security is not dealing with the symptoms of insecurity as it might be counterproductive to do so. To him, managing security has to do with dealing with the fundamental cause(s) and also by isolating the symptoms of insecurity. Alluding to this, Achumba, Ighomereho, & Akpor-Robaro (2013:93-94) suggested two-way approaches for

managing security. The first aims at addressing the causative factors of insecurity, while the second targets at addressing the perpetuating factors of insecurity. Also, Bar-Tal & Jacobson (1998) in Ogbonnaya & Ehigiamusoe (2013:4) submit that the creation of enabling conditions for the citizens to maximise their potential is a way government can manage insecurity. Similarly, the Ledum Mitee led Technical Committee on the Niger Delta culled from Bassey (2012:84-85) recommends the establishment of labour employment schemes and skills acquisition centres cum effective equipment of the security forces. These views tend to see security management from the angle of employment creation cum proper equipping of security forces.

Relatedly, some studies further suggested that the political leadership can play critical role in managing security (Emuedo, 2012; Ikelegbe, 2011; Campbell, 2010; Alao, 2007 in Julius, 2014:84). Supporting this view point, Glaeser (2002) culled from Ikejiaku (2012:134-135) asserts that political leaders usually have the tendency to advance and maintain whatever is of interest to them. This simply implies that if security management is in the interest of the political leaders, they will work towards its attainment. Nigro & Nigro (1977) in Akinola, Adebisi, & Oyewo (2015:85) submit that once the political leaders have conviction on what should be done, they will put in their very best to get it done. The review tends to suggest that there is a connection between security management and poverty levels.

3.0 Methodology

The ex post facto and causal designs were adopted for this study. The Niger Delta comprised 9 states with a population frame of 37,224,577 (Igwe, 2015:96). A multi-stage sample design was adopted to select 3 states using Yamene formula on a 0.5 precision. Through proportionate and simple random selection, 2 local government areas from 9 senatorial district of the selected states were chosen. In determining the sample size for the study, the Taro Yamane formula was applied on 0.05 level of precision but with upward adjustment to 405. 18 communities/towns were randomly selected as followed: Ekowe in Southern Ijaw and Yenagoa in Yenagoa local government areas (Bayelsa central); Nembe city in Nembe and Ogbia town in Ogbia local government areas (Bayelsa East); Ekeremor in Ekeremor and Sagbama in Sagbama local government areas (Bayelsa West); Ughelli in Ughelli North and Otu Jeremi in Ughelli South local government areas (Delta central); Issele Ukwu in Aniocha North and Ogwashi Ukwu in Aniocha South local government areas (Delta North); Bomadi in Bomadi and Olomoro in Isoko South local government areas (Delta South); Okrika in Okrika and Borokiri in Port Harcourt local government areas (Rivers East); Ogale in Eleme and Afam in Oyiibo local government areas (Rivers South-East); Mbiama in Ahoada East and Buguma in Asari-Toru local government areas (Rivers West). The survey targeted 27 respondents from among ex-militants, youth, security agencies, community leaders, and government officials in each of the selected states. The study also employed secondary data to serve as baseline data cum ensure objectivity.

Relevant descriptive statistical methods were used in testing the research questions. Data interpretation followed the presentation of research questions whose charts corresponded with their percentages. While the research hypotheses were analysed using inferential statistics, specifically, the Chi-square (X^2) statistical tool. These analyses were carried out with the use of excel 2013.

4.0 Results and Discussion

4.1 Presentation and Analysis of Data

A key factor in determining the incidence of poverty in the Niger Delta is the critical issues of deprivation. A cursory look at table 4.1 shows that the average of 24.4% in the Niger Delta suffer deprivation in at least 33.3% scale, while the entire national average is 45.5%; the average intensity of the deprivation experienced in the Niger Delta is 42.5%, while the national average is 49.7%; also, 10.4% in the Niger Delta and 24.8% at the national level are multidimensionally poor; 24.2% in the Niger Delta and 19.6% in the national average were shown as vulnerable to suffering multiple deprivations; again, 6.0% in the Niger Delta and 25.6% in the national are in severe multidimensional poverty; for the destitute, Niger Delta has 8.1% and the national has 27.3%; the Niger Delta has 8.3%, while the National has 16.6% among the multidimensional poor.

Table 4.1: Multidimensional Poverty in the Niger Delta States (2013).

| States | H (Incidence) K=33.3% | A (Intensity) (%) | MPI (H x A) (%) | Percentage of Population | | | Inequality Among the MPI Poor (%) |
|---------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|--|----------------------------------|------------------|--|
| | | | | Vulnerable to Poverty 20% - 33.3% | In Severe Poverty K=50% | Destitute (%) | |
| Abia | 21.0 | 42.0 | 8.8 | 25.3 | 4.8 | 7.7 | 7.8 |
| Akwa Ibom | 23.8 | 41.6 | 9.9 | 22.8 | 5.2 | 7.2 | 7.9 |
| Bayelsa | 29.0 | 41.4 | 12.0 | 26.8 | 5.9 | 8.6 | 6.6 |
| Cross River | 33.1 | 44.2 | 14.6 | 24.9 | 9.0 | 10.2 | 10.6 |
| Delta | 25.1 | 42.5 | 10.7 | 22.5 | 6.6 | 9.6 | 10.6 |
| Edo | 19.2 | 41.5 | 8.0 | 23.9 | 4.5 | 6.5 | 7.8 |
| Imo | 19.8 | 41.9 | 8.3 | 24.0 | 4.9 | 6.2 | 6.8 |
| Ondo | 27.9 | 45.4 | 12.7 | 26.6 | 8.2 | 11.0 | 8.9 |
| Rivers | 21.1 | 41.6 | 8.8 | 21.3 | 4.7 | 6.3 | 7.3 |
| Niger Delta Mean | 24.4 | 42.5 | 10.4 | 24.2 | 6.0 | 8.1 | 8.3 |
| National Mean | 45.5 | 49.7 | 24.8 | 19.6 | 25.6 | 27.3 | 16.6 |

Source: Calculated from the World Bank (2017) in Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (2017: Ch 1:5)

Also, the security challenges in the Niger Delta have led to the loss of many lives cum opportunities for economic prosperity. The baseline data on security challenges in the Niger Delta reveals that there were recorded cases of deaths from crimes in the Niger Delta. Table 4.2 indicates that between 2006 and 2015, armed robbery accounts for 1671 deaths representing 39.2% at the national level; the casualty figures from cultism is 1560 representing 66.0% in the national total; the number of deaths recorded from kidnapping is 260 which accounts for 56.9% nationally; and assassination/thuggery recorded 134 fatalities accounting for 19.8% in the country.

Table 4.2: Statistical data on fatal security challenges in the Niger Delta 2006-2015

| State | Armed Robbery | Cultism | Kidnapping | Assassination/Thuggery |
|-------------------|---------------|---------|------------|------------------------|
| Abia | 107 | 12 | 53 | 6 |
| Akwa Ibom | 66 | 64 | 15 | 9 |
| Bayelsa | 16 | 104 | 14 | 5 |
| Cross River | 28 | 40 | 5 | 5 |
| Delta | 946 | 202 | 55 | 32 |
| Edo | 109 | 306 | 15 | 12 |
| Imo | 104 | 47 | 25 | 23 |
| Ondo | 98 | 20 | 11 | 10 |
| Rivers | 197 | 765 | 67 | 32 |
| Niger Delta Total | 1671 | 1560 | 260 | 134 |
| National Total | 4268 | 2363 | 457 | 676 |

Source: The database of Nigeria Watch in Nwankwo & Okolie-Osemene (2016:15)


The statistical data in table 4.2 above did not actually show the number of crimes that were carried out as well as the effects of such crimes on the economy of the Niger Delta. It however tends to serve as a parameter to describe the reality of the incidence of insecurity in the Niger Delta.

Distribution of Respondents

Question 1): Do you think there is relationship between poverty and militancy?

A total of 384 responses were collected for question 1, out of which ex-militants are 76, youth are 81, security agencies are 74, community leaders are 78, and government officials are 75.

Figure 4.1: Opinions on the relationship between poverty and militancy (in %).



Source: Field Work 2017

Figure 4.1 represents the opinions of respondents on whether there is relationship between poverty and militancy. Based on the data above, 81.6% ex-militants, 74.1% youth, 18.9% security agencies, 64.1% community leaders, and 72.0% government officials strongly agreed that there is relationship between poverty and militancy. The respondents who agreed that there is relationship between poverty and militancy are 18.4% ex-militants, 17.3% youth, 52.7%


security agencies, 33.3% community leaders, and 22.7% government officials. Those who strongly disagreed that there is relationship between poverty and militancy are 0.0% ex-militants, 3.7% youth, 4.1% security agencies, 1.3% community leaders, and 2.7% government officials. While the respondents who disagreed that there is relationship between poverty and militancy are 0.0% ex-militants, 4.9% youth, 24.3% security agencies, 1.3% community leaders, and 2.7% government officials.

In the total, as captured in the figure 4.1, the opinions of respondents on whether there is relationship between militancy and poverty show that those who strongly agreed had the highest with 62.5% responses, those who agreed had the second highest with 28.6% responses, while those who disagreed had the third highest with 6.5% responses, and those who strongly disagreed had the least with 2.3% responses. The implication of this is that militancy and poverty appear to have relationship.

Question 2): Is there any relationship between security management and poverty levels in the Niger Delta?

A total of 386 responses were collected for question 2, out of which ex-militants filled 77, youth filled 81, security agencies filled 74, community leaders filled 78, and government officials filled 76.

Figure 4.2: Perception on the relationship between security management and poverty levels in the Niger Delta (in %).



Source: Field Work 2017

The chart in figure 4.2 shows the opinions of respondents on whether there is any relationship between security management and poverty levels in the Niger Delta. The respondents who strongly agreed that there is a relationship between security management and poverty levels in the Niger Delta are 36.4% ex-militants, 29.6% youth, 12.2% security agencies, 19.2% community leaders, and 39.5% government officials. Those who agreed that there is a relationship between security management and poverty levels in the Niger Delta are 48.1% ex-militants, 56.8% youth, 32.4% security agencies, 73.1% community leaders, and 46.1% government officials. The respondents who strongly disagreed that there is any relationship between security management and poverty levels in the Niger Delta are 6.5% ex-militants, 2.5% youth, 6.8% security agencies, 0.0% community leaders, and 3.9% government officials.

While those who disagreed that there is a relationship between security management and poverty levels in the Niger Delta are 9.1% ex-militants, 11.1% youth, 48.6% security agencies, 7.7% community leaders, and 10.5% government officials.

From the total responses, on whether there is any relationship between security management and poverty levels in the Niger Delta, as captured in the figure 4.2, the respondents who agreed had the highest responses with 51.6%, those who strongly agreed had the second highest responses with 27.5%, and those who disagreed had the third highest responses with 17.1%, while those who strongly disagreed had the least responses with 3.9%. The implication of this is that security management and poverty levels in the Niger Delta appear to have relationship.

4.2 Test of Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1):

H₀: There is no significant relationship between insecurity and poverty in the Niger Delta.

H₁: There is a significant relationship between insecurity and poverty in the Niger Delta.

To test for the hypothesis, question one (1) was used for the chi-square analysis. The question examined whether there is a relationship between militancy and poverty in the Niger Delta.

Table 4.3: Perception on the relationship between militancy and poverty in the Niger Delta.

| RESPONDENTS | STRONGLY AGREED | AGREED | STRONGLY DISAGREED | DISAGREED | TOTAL |
|----------------------|-----------------|--------|--------------------|-----------|-------|
| EX-MILITANTS | 62 | 14 | 0 | 0 | 76 |
| YOUTH | 60 | 14 | 3 | 4 | 81 |
| SECURITY AGENCIES | 14 | 39 | 3 | 18 | 74 |
| COMMUNITY LEADERS | 50 | 26 | 1 | 1 | 78 |
| GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS | 54 | 17 | 2 | 2 | 75 |
| TOTAL | 240 | 110 | 9 | 25 | 384 |

Source: Field Work 2017

To do the calculation, the formula for Chi-Square (X^2) is:

$$X^2 = \sum \frac{(O - E)^2}{E}$$

Where X^2 = Chi-Square; Σ = Summation or Sum of; O = Observed Frequency; and E = Expected Frequency

Table 4.4: Computation of Chi-Square Based on (O) and (E) Frequencies to determine the relationship between poverty and militancy.

| Cell | O | E | O-E | (O-E) ² | (O-E) ² /E |
|--------------|----|-------|--------|--------------------|-----------------------|
| (a) | 62 | 47.50 | 14.50 | 210.25 | 4.43 |
| (b) | 14 | 21.77 | -7.77 | 60.39 | 2.77 |
| (c) | 0 | 1.78 | -1.78 | 3.17 | 1.78 |
| (d) | 0 | 4.95 | -4.95 | 24.48 | 4.95 |
| (e) | 60 | 50.63 | 9.38 | 87.89 | 1.74 |
| (f) | 14 | 23.20 | -9.20 | 84.70 | 3.65 |
| (g) | 3 | 1.90 | 1.10 | 1.21 | 0.64 |
| (h) | 4 | 5.27 | -1.27 | 1.62 | 0.31 |
| (i) | 14 | 46.25 | -32.25 | 1040.06 | 22.49 |
| (j) | 39 | 21.20 | 17.80 | 316.91 | 14.95 |
| (k) | 3 | 1.73 | 1.27 | 1.60 | 0.92 |
| (l) | 18 | 4.82 | 13.18 | 173.77 | 36.07 |
| (m) | 50 | 48.75 | 1.25 | 1.56 | 0.03 |
| (n) | 26 | 22.34 | 3.66 | 13.37 | 0.60 |
| (o) | 1 | 1.83 | -0.83 | 0.69 | 0.38 |
| (p) | 1 | 5.08 | -4.08 | 16.63 | 3.28 |
| (q) | 54 | 46.88 | 7.13 | 50.77 | 1.08 |
| (r) | 17 | 21.48 | -4.48 | 20.11 | 0.94 |
| (s) | 2 | 1.76 | 0.24 | 0.06 | 0.03 |
| (t) | 2 | 4.88 | -2.88 | 8.31 | 1.70 |
| Total | | | | | 102.73 |

Source: Field Work 2017

From table 4.4 above, the calculated value is 102.73.

To determine the degree of freedom (df). The formula is: $df = (R - 1)(C - 1)$

Where R = the number of rows, and C = the number of columns.

Applying the above formula, the table 4.6 shows the degree of freedom as:

$$df = (5 - 1)(4 - 1). \text{ Where } 4 \times 3 = 12.$$

At 0.05 level of significance and degree of freedom at 12, the table value is 21.026.

Re-State the Decision Rule:

Retain the null hypothesis if the calculated value is less than the table value but reject the null hypothesis if the calculated value is greater than the table value.

From the results, the calculated value is 102.73 and the table value is 21.026, the null hypothesis is accordingly rejected, and the alternative hypothesis is therefore retained. The implication is that based on the foregoing test of statistical hypothesis there is a significant relationship between insecurity and poverty in the Niger Delta.

Hypothesis 2):

H₀: There is no significant relationship between security management and poverty levels in the Niger Delta.

H₁: There is a significant relationship between security management and poverty levels in the Niger Delta.

To test for the hypothesis 2, question 2 was used for the chi-square analysis. The question aimed to determine whether there is any relationship between security management and poverty levels in the Niger Delta?

Question 2): Is there any relationship between security management and poverty levels in the Niger Delta?

Table 4.5: Opinions on the relationship between security management and poverty levels in the Niger Delta.

| RESPONDENTS | STRONGLY AGREED | AGREED | STRONGLY DISAGREED | DISAGREED | TOTAL |
|----------------------|-----------------|--------|--------------------|-----------|-------|
| EX-MILITANTS | 28 | 37 | 5 | 7 | 77 |
| YOUTH | 24 | 46 | 2 | 9 | 81 |
| SECURITY AGENCIES | 9 | 24 | 5 | 36 | 74 |
| COMMUNITY LEADERS | 15 | 57 | 0 | 6 | 78 |
| GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS | 30 | 35 | 3 | 8 | 76 |
| TOTAL | 106 | 199 | 15 | 66 | 386 |

Source: Field Work 2017

The formula for Chi-Square (X^2) will be used to do the calculation:

$$X^2 = \sum \frac{(O - E)^2}{E}$$

Where X^2 stands for Chi-Square, Σ stands for Summation or Sum of, O stands for Observed Frequency, and E stands for Expected Frequency.

Table 4.6: Computation of Chi-Square Based on (O) and (E) Frequencies to determine the relationship between security management and poverty levels in the Niger Delta.

| Cell | O | E | O-E | (O-E) ² | (O-E) ² /E |
|-------|----|-------|--------|--------------------|-----------------------|
| (a) | 28 | 21.15 | 6.85 | 46.99 | 2.22 |
| (b) | 37 | 39.70 | -2.70 | 7.27 | 0.18 |
| (c) | 5 | 2.99 | 2.01 | 4.03 | 1.35 |
| (d) | 7 | 13.17 | -6.17 | 38.02 | 2.89 |
| (e) | 24 | 22.24 | 1.76 | 3.09 | 0.14 |
| (f) | 46 | 41.76 | 4.24 | 17.99 | 0.43 |
| (g) | 2 | 3.15 | -1.15 | 1.32 | 0.42 |
| (h) | 9 | 13.85 | -4.85 | 23.52 | 1.70 |
| (i) | 9 | 20.32 | -11.32 | 128.17 | 6.31 |
| (j) | 24 | 38.15 | -14.15 | 200.23 | 5.25 |
| (k) | 5 | 2.88 | 2.12 | 4.51 | 1.57 |
| (l) | 36 | 12.65 | 23.35 | 545.09 | 43.08 |
| (m) | 15 | 21.42 | -6.42 | 41.21 | 1.92 |
| (n) | 57 | 40.21 | 16.79 | 281.82 | 7.01 |
| (o) | 0 | 3.03 | -3.03 | 9.19 | 3.03 |
| (p) | 6 | 13.34 | -7.34 | 53.83 | 4.04 |
| (q) | 30 | 20.87 | 9.13 | 83.35 | 3.99 |
| (r) | 35 | 39.18 | -4.18 | 17.48 | 0.45 |
| (s) | 3 | 2.95 | 0.05 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| (t) | 8 | 12.99 | -4.99 | 24.95 | 1.92 |
| Total | | | | | 87.89 |

Source: Field Work 2017

Table 4.6 shows that the calculated value is 87.89.

The formula to determine the degree of freedom (df) is:

$$df = (R - 1)(C - 1)$$

Where R stands for the number of rows. And C stands for the number of columns

Applying the above formula, the table 4.8 shows the degree of freedom as:

$$df = (5 - 1)(4 - 1). \text{ And } 4 \times 3 = 12.$$

At 12 degree of freedom and level of significance at 0.05, the table value is 21.026.

Re-State the Decision Rule:

Retain the null hypothesis if the calculated value is less than the table value but reject the null hypothesis if otherwise.

From the results, the calculated value is 87.89 and the table value is 21.026, the null hypothesis is hereby rejected, while the alternative hypothesis is retained. The implication is that based on the foregoing test of statistical hypothesis there is a significant relationship between security management and poverty levels in the Niger Delta.

4.3 Discussion of Findings

The result from the test of hypothesis one (1) shows that there is indeed a significant relationship between insecurity and poverty in the Niger Delta. This finding can be tied to the frustration-aggression theory. This means that the incidence of poverty have led to deep rooted frustration among the people who feel that the region should fare better. The finding of this study appears to conform to the observations of researchers like Fukuyama (2004), Ikejiaku (2012), Nwagboso (2015), Ayelowo (2016:7), and Olufemi, Balami, & Ochogwu (2016:55-56) whose work indicate that there is a connection between insecurity and poverty. Fukuyama (2004) cited in Achumba, Ighomereho, & Akpor-Robaro (2013:81) aptly explains that what has created the huge pool of frustrated people in the Niger Delta is basically the near absence of basic infrastructure in the area and that the people easily get ignited by any act which they deemed insensitive in order to perpetrate insecurity. Also, Amaizu (2008) in Nwagboso (2012:250) identifies absence of basic infrastructural facilities, presence of multidimensional poverty, joblessness and frustration which have variously given room for aggression and security challenges in the Niger Delta (see also, Ayelowo, 2016:7).

Relatedly, this study also examines the relationship between security management and poverty levels in the Niger Delta. The result of the analysis of hypothesis two (2) shows that there is a significant relationship between security management and poverty levels in the Niger Delta. There are supports for this result in the work of Igbuzor (2011), Emuedo (2013:15), Akpan (2014:46), Nnorom & Odigbo (2015:211), De Juan & Pierskalla (2015:177), Ebere Onwudiwe, and the report of Ledum Mitee led Technical Committee on the Niger Delta. They all link security management and poverty levels in the Niger Delta. As observed by Igbuzor (2011) in Achumba, Ighomereho, & Akpor-Robaro (2013:81) what the political leadership need for security management include effective delivery of public services and the provision for the basic needs of the people. Emuedo (2013:15) points out that in the past, security challenges have been used as excuse by the political leaders for not embarking on infrastructural development in the Niger Delta.

In discussing the link between security management and poverty levels, Rotberg (2003:9) in Uzodike & Maiangwa (2012:97) and Fukuyama (2004) in Achumba, Ighomereho, & Akpor-Robaro (2013:81) state that the provision of basic infrastructure even in remote corners will go a long way in making the people to feel that they are shown concerned and have stake in the state. In this circumstance, the people will have little or no cause to feel frustrated, especially as their living standard would have improved consequent of the built-in security management put in place.

5.0 Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations

5.1 Summary and Conclusion

The overall aim of this study was to describe insecurity management and poverty using the realities in the Niger Delta (1999-2017). The specific issue that has underpinned this study is to determine the relationship between insecurity and poverty in the Niger Delta. The study also aimed to examine the relationship between security management and poverty levels in the Niger Delta. Notwithstanding the contentions among scholars regarding the pattern of relationship between insecurity and poverty, the overall estimation of this study is that the lingering issues of insecurity in the Niger Delta can best be understood within the frustration-aggression theoretical framework which links the occurrence aggressive act to the existence of frustration.

The research methodology was based on ex post facto and causal design. The population of the study targetted 405 respondents from among ex-militants, youth, security agencies, community leaders, and government officials in 3 states: Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers, out of 9 oil producing states of the Niger Delta. The Taro Yamane formula was used to determine the sample size of the study using a 3 stage sampling technique. Charts, mean, frequencies, percentages and tables were employed to answer research questions. The Chi-square (X^2) statistical tool was used to test the hypotheses at 0.05 level of significance.

The major findings of the study showed that there is a significant relationship between insecurity and poverty cum security management and poverty levels in the Niger Delta. The study concludes that the existence of poverty is the underlying factor that triggers security challenges in the Niger Delta, therefore, there is need to address poverty in order to manage security and ensure the stability of the Niger Delta.

5.2 Recommendations

In line with the findings of this study, recommendations are hereby made as follow;

- 1) The issues of poverty in the Niger Delta should be proactively and responsively handled by the political office holders. Practical step in this direction will include effective service delivery and the provision of infrastructural facilities in the region.
- 2) Priority should be given on how to mitigate the burden of oil production, and also, those who lost their means of livelihood due to environmental degradation or pollution should be appropriately considered and compensated.
- 3) Every part of the Niger Delta should be made to feel the presence of governance. Places like the creeks should be transformed to safe and productive centres that will meet the need of the people. In addition, skill acquisition centres and employment opportunities that suit the environment should be provided for the poor.
- 4) The people should be carried along in the security management of their area. Constructive engagement between the government and the people will help to smoothen areas of differences.

5.3 Contribution to Knowledge

The contentions among scholars on the pattern of relationship between poverty and insecurity made the study of insecurity-poverty seemingly inconclusive. This study establishes the following:

- 1) That there is a significant relationship between insecurity and poverty in the Niger Delta.
- 2) That there is a relationship between security management and poverty levels in the Niger.

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